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9.1 Introduction 
The American continent has a long tradition of autonomous regimes, both territorial and 
non-territorial. Autonomous regimes of American indigenous communities in particular 
have not been the subject of intense discussion and comparison, partly because the task of 
discussing such autonomous regimes in the whole of the Americas represents a huge 
challenge. Although all American indigenous peoples have as a common denominator the 
European colonization and their subsequent extinction to a large degree, their stories 
certainly differ. ‘Caught within colonial systems, whether through imperialism as settlers 
arrived in their territories or through the nation-state system and its hierarchy of 
categories designed to protect and promote the powerful’,
1
 their situation has been shaped 
considerably by their specific history of colonization. In Latin America, the Spaniards 
tried to rule the already existing indigenous societies: the encomieda system allowed 
prominent Spaniards to be in charge of indigenous communities. In exchange for their 
labour and resources, the Spanish lord would guarantee protection and education. It was 
                                                          
1
 Mario Blaser, Ravi de Costa, Deborah McGregor, and William D. Coleman, 
‘Reconfiguring the Web of Life: Indigenous Peoples, Relationality, and Globalisation’, in 
Indigenous Peoples and Autonomy, Insights for a Global Age, edited by Mario Blaser, 
Ravi de Costa, Deborah McGregor, and William D. Coleman (Vancouver: UCB Press, 
2010), p. 17. 
‘thinly masked slavery’. In North America, the English chose to create new societies 
separate from the existing indigenous communities. After wars, enslavement, and forced 
relocations, they often concluded treaties of coexistence, albeit at times with dire 
conditions for indigenous groups.
2
 The different strategies of colonizers were determined 
also by the circumstances, for example the large numbers of indigenous inhabitants in 
Latin America and the rather smaller numbers of indigenous inhabitants in North 
America. As time went by, the lines between Spaniards and indigenous Americans 
became blurred in Latin America, whereas such lines remained rather obvious in North 
America. At the same time, the Spaniards were more focused on taking the natural 
resources of the territories they occupied, whereas the English spent more time 
developing trade and agriculture. Nothwithstanding the different ways, both strategies led 
to the extinction, structural discrimination, and historical injustices of the American 
indigenous communities. 
Indigenous peoples of the whole of the Americas suffered intensely from 
centuries of assimilation polices imposed on them by the newcomers. Panama and Brazil 
are notable examples of assimilation for centuries, but so are Guatemala and its adopted 
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policies ‘of ‘containment, if not overt extermination’,
3
 Bolivia in the pre-Morales era, 
Canada and the US.
4
 
Indigenous peoples in North America have seen an improvement in their rights, 
although their relationship to the states is defined ‘by the historical exercise of 
hierarchical power by the state over Aboriginal peoples, the marginalization and 
suppression of Aboriginal cultures, and lack of imagination in relation to Aboriginal 
forms of governance—features central to the colonial project in Canada’.
5
 The US has so 
called government-to-government relations with approximately 566 American Indian and 
Alaska Native tribes and villages. Native Hawaiians do not have the same status, 
although they have some form of federal recognition, whereas other indigenous groups 
are not federally recognized, even though some have acquired status at the state level.
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The federally recognized tribes have reservations or other lands set aside for them, over 
which they exercise powers of self-government. 
In Canada, in 1996 the state recognized that indigenous peoples have ‘an inherent 
right to self-government’ under Section 35 of the (1982) Constitution Act
7
 and promised 
the negotiation of new institutions of indigenous self-government in education, health, 
social services, language, culture, religion, policing, property rights, and the 
administration and enforcement of indigenous laws. This went further than the 
conditional powers available to indigenous communities under the Indian Act.
8
 Still, 
‘power imbalance, cultural dominance, and the challenge of reimagining governmental 
relationships between Aboriginal peoples and the state continue to dominate Canada’s 




In Latin America, currently large numbers of indigenous peoples are found 
mainly where pre-colonial civilizations prospered: very large numbers in Bolivia and 
Guatemala, a significant percentage in Peru and Ecuador, and some smaller groups in 
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Belize, Honduras, and Mexico.
10
 The past two decades have witnessed a process of 
change in many Latin American states. In some countries indigenous peoples are still far 
from reaching effective political rights and autonomy, but in other countries they have 
achieved a lot. Hiskey and Goodman note: ‘From the election of Evo Morales as 
president of Bolivia in 2006 to the ongoing Zapatista conflict in southern Mexico, the 
collective voice of indigenous peoples across the region has grown increasingly louder, 
albeit in different forms, as their respective political systems have continued to open up 
to them.’
11
 Several Latin American states have recently acknowledged their multicultural 
and pluri-ethnic character. Within this framework, several states, including Colombia, 
Bolivia, and Panama, have established or renewed legal arrangements for indigenous 
territorial autonomy that allow indigenous peoples to govern themselves according to 
their own principles and beliefs and through their own social institutions and systems. 
These arrangements ‘purport to institutionalize forms of what could be called official 
(constitutional) political and legal pluralism’.
12
 These are important steps away from the 
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statist legal and political model that marginalized and oppressed indigenous peoples. 
However, such developments have stayed to a large degree on paper and have not been 
fully implemented, as this would require a complete overhaul of the relations between 
indigenous peoples and non-indigenous peoples in Latin America.
13
 Van Cott argues that 
while indigenous peoples in North America seem to be struggling to get more extensive 
autonomy over their affairs, the struggle of indigenous peoples in Latin America seems to 
be the reconciling of the duality between having the right to be indigenous and having 
rights as full and equal citizens of the states.
14
 
9.2 Definitional Issues 
Indigenous autonomy as a term is used rather loosely in the literature to denote a number 
of concepts ranging from political representation to development of indigenous languages 
and identities to organized political resistance.
15
 For example, de Costa notes that ‘the 
richness and complexity of indigenous peoples autonomy projects are visible in 
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interpersonal relations, struggles at the community level, regional arrangements regarding 




In North America claims for autonomy are seen through the lens of the term 
‘sovereignty’ and this concept is often used in relation to autonomous regimes. Although 
the concept of sovereignty has been used by US tribes to assert their previous 
independence, Anghie has criticized it as a mainly Eurocentric concept, arisen in the 
process of delegitimizing the claims of ‘nomadic colonial peoples’ and legitimizing the 
grabbing of their territories.
17
 Young has favoured a hybridized ‘principle of local self-
determination enacted in the context of global governance structures’ manifested as a 
decentralized democratic federalism patterned on Iroquois concepts of federalism.
18
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For the purposes of this chapter, it seems that the best guide to understand the 
various aspects of American autonomous regimes is the draft American Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous peoples (draft American Declaration). Its elaboration started in 
2006. Negotiations were stalled in 2012 and started again in 2015, though without 
evidence of serious progress. Nevertheless, the text of the draft American Declaration, 
quite similar to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP), but modified to reflect the particularities of the region and the region’s 
indigenous claims, offers a real insight into the understandings and categories of 
autonomous regimes in the region. 
Provisions related to autonomy are scattered in the current text of the draft 
Declaration. The main relevant provision is Article XX, an article not yet adopted by the 
American states. Currently it reads: 
1. Indigenous peoples, [as one of the ways to exercise their] [in the exercise 
of] the right to self-determination [within the states], have the right to 
autonomy or [and] self-government with respect to inter alia, culture, 
language, spirituality, education, [information, means of communication,] 
health, housing, employment, social well-being, maintenance [of 
community security], [of jurisdictional functions in matters of territory,] 
family relations, economic activities, administration of land and resources, 
environment and [entry of non-members]; [and to determine with states 
the ways and means of financing {the exercise of these rights} these 
autonomous functions]. 
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and develop their own 
decision-making institutions. 
The current draft provision is a detailed version of the corresponding Article 4 of 
UNDRIP, which recognizes that ‘indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-
determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their 
internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous 
functions’. 
Let us see in more detail the different types of autonomy in the Americas. 
9.3 Territorial Autonomy 
In addition to Article XX, the draft American Declaration currently acknowledges in 
Article VI that indigenous peoples have the right ‘to their social, political, and economic 
organisation; [to their legal systems]; [and to administer their lands, territories and natural 
resources].’ Although states have not yet agreed on the recognition of indigenous 
peoples’ legal systems and administration of their lands, it seems that their right to social, 
political, and economic organization is agreed. 
9.3.1 Territorial Autonomy in North America 
The past policies of separation between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples have 
particularly favoured territorial autonomy in North America. Indigenous band 
governments in Canada have had authority over their reserves for a long time, set out by 
the Indian Act. However, the system had a lot of problems. In 1983, the Special 
Committee of the House of Commons on Indian Self-Government recommended that the 
federal government recognize indigenous bands as a distinct order of government within 
the Canadian federation and begin to negotiate self-government agreements with Indian 
bands. In 1996, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples also recommended that 
Aboriginal governments become recognized as the third level of government in Canada, 
in addition to the federal government and the provinces; however, the shift had moved on 
from constitutional recognition to negotiation between the state and the various 
indigenous communities. Despite a large number of such negotiations since the 1990s, 
only about twenty such agreements have been reached, most of them closely linked to 
land claims. More than eighty negotiations are still pending and the federal government 
recently concluded that the self-government negotiation process is ‘not sustainable’,
19
 
while the Supreme Court of Canada has thus far declined invitations to declare that self-
governance is a constitutionally protected Aboriginal right. Tired of waiting for the 
negotiations to bear fruit, some indigenous communities have now started to act 
unilaterally. In January 2014, the Nipissing First Nation adopted what is believed to be 
the first constitution for a First Nation in Ontario that replaces the Indian Act as the 




Such autonomous arrangements are in most cases related to land claims. Indeed, 
in order to make autonomous regimes effective, a number of other rights must also be 
recognized, such as the indigenous rights to manage the environment and their lands (art  
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XVIII.2 of the draft American Declaration), indigenous rights to free, prior, and informed 
consent related to the environment of their lands (art XVIII.3), and rights to create their 
own protected areas of conservation on their lands. The Inter-American Court for Human 
Rights has also recognized the important link between indigenous autonomy and land 
rights. In Awas Tingi v. Nicaragua, Saramaka v. Suriname, and Sarayaku v. Ecuador, the 
Court used the right to property, as recognized in Article 21 of the American Convention 
on Human Rights (ACHR), as the basis to discuss violations to indigenous autonomy.
21
 
Unfortunately, the above-mentioned provisions have not yet been agreed in the American 
Declaration, even though of course states have consented to similar provisions of 
UNDRIP. It should be noted that following the initial rejections of UNDRIP, both 
Canada and the US later agreed to its content. Indigenous autonomy cannot be 
disentangled from indigenous struggle for control over their territories. In Canada, when 
the Quebec government started hydroelectric projects after a period of intense forestry 
and mining development without Cree involvement, the Crees began to oppose such 
projects that harmed their lands.
22
 After resorting to the courts and rejecting a quick 
settlement, negotiations began with the federal government and Quebec that led to the 
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James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA), signed in 1975.
23
 The agreement 
allowed the project to continue but recognized the rights of the Crees to live their own 
way of life and established measures to ensure the Crees’ land use and participation in 
decision-making. It established co-management in many areas of policymaking, but the 
state decisions would still be subject to the final authority of the state. Despite the 
agreement, Crees continued to be excluded from decision-making regarding the 
development of the land, their governance in the territory, and their participation in 
resource development and benefits.
24
 
Currently, the Cree autonomous regime in Quebec is also not subject to the Indian 
Act. The Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act of 1984 recognized that nine Cree communities 
are not subject to the Indian Act or the band system, but are represented by the Grand 
Council of the Crees (Eeyou Istchee) or GCCEI and governed by the Cree Regional 
Authority. The Grand Council of the Crees signed an agreement in 2012 with the 
province of Quebec that would abolish the municipalities in the region and merge them 
with the Cree Regional Authority in a new regional government called the Eeyou Istchee 
James Bay Territory. They are still in talks with the federal government on a Cree Nation 
Governance Agreement to refine the new structure’s relationship to the federal 
authorities. Coyle has discussed the negative effects of asymmetries in negotiation power 
on negotiations relating to self-government between indigenous peoples and the state.
25
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In addition to the land element, two self-government agreements in Canada 
recognize indigenous autonomy over educational matters. In Nova Scotia and British 
Columbia, law-making authority has been conferred on the indigenous communities, with 
the government of Canada providing education programme and governance funding 
through a transfer agreement to the signatory groups. In Nova Scotia, an education self-
government agreement has been in place since 1997. As part of this agreement, the First 
Nations that operate on-reserve schools do so through the Mi’kmaw Kina’matnewey 
(MK) education organization. MK has a Master Education Agreement with the Nova 
Scotia Ministry of Education, which formalizes collaboration between the two 
organizations. In British Columbia, eleven First Nation bands have been given self-
government on education matters after agreements with the government and the province. 
The Agreement allows participating communities to ‘provide primary, elementary, and 
secondary education programs and services comparable to those provided by other 
education systems in Canada, so as to permit the transfer of students between education 
systems without academic penalty.’
26
 
A notably wide autonomous regime was agreed following the Nunavut 
Agreement in Canada. A new federal territory, Nunavut, was created in 1999, separate 
from the North Territories, where other indigenous communities lived. Nunavut is not 
reserved exclusively for the Inuit. Any adult Canadian citizen who has been living in 
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Nunavut for more than a year can vote in its elections.
27[13]
 However the strong Inuit 
majority is reflected in the governance of the territory. 
In addition to the political strategies and lobbying for more self-government, 
Canadian indigenous peoples have also resorted to litigation, with mixed results. As 
Peach notes, ‘whereas Canadian courts have, on occasion, provided Indigenous peoples 
with significant victories, in cases such as Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of 
Forests) and Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia (Project Assessment 
Director), the courts have also provided them with a number of painful defeats and have 




Although indigenous territorial autonomy units in Canada and the US have many 
similar characteristics, unlike Canada, the US Supreme Court has recognized that Indian 
tribes are inherently sovereign nations with powers of self-government. However, first, 
only recognized nations have self-government powers. This leaves indigenous peoples in 
Alaska and Hawaii in a very vulnerable position. Secondly, even recognized tribes who 
enjoy self-government, had both their sovereignty and their original land rights and are 
now under the power of the US.
29
 Anaya notes: ‘tribes are sovereign nations with certain 
inherent powers of self-government and original rights, but they are rendered, in words 
penned by the famous Supreme Court Justice John Marshall, “domestic dependent 
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nations,” subject to the overriding power of the federal Government’.
30
 Many self-
government structures are connected to treaties that were signed between the US and the 
tribes. Although the treaty-making stopped in 1871, ‘many of the historical treaties with 
tribes continue in force as part of federal law and to define United States-tribal 
relations’.
31
 The (1924) Indian Reorganization Act included provisions that protected 
Indian lands and provided for establishing reservation-based governments similar to local 
municipalities. However, it served as a way of gradual assimilation. Many Indian tribes 
today continue under the IRA regime of the Indian Self-Determination and Education 
Assistance Act of 1975, by which tribes are able to assume the planning and 
administration of federal programmes that are devised for their benefit. The UN Special 
Rapporteur has highlighted some of the problems of territorial autonomous regimes for 
reservation autonomies. US courts have consistently restricted the self-government of 
such units, to limit the powers of tribal decision-making bodies and judiciary.
32
 
9.3.2 Territorial autonomy in Latin America 
Territorial autonomy is not restricted by any means to North America. Although some 
Latin American states have not established autonomy for their indigenous populations, 
for example Argentina, other include such arrangements in their constitution. Article 2 of 
the Constitution of Mexico ‘guarantees and protects the rights of indigenous peoples and 
communities to self-determination and consequently to autonomy’. The examples of 
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Oaxaca and the Chiapas autonomous regimes (and their failures to move effectively from 
promises to reality) offer important lessons.
33
 In addition, Article 260 of the Constitution 
of Venezuela states that ‘the legitimate authorities of the native peoples shall have the 
power to apply, within their territorial competence levels of administration of justice’, 
whereas the Constitution of Bolivia (2009) recognizes in Article 190 the indigenous 
‘jurisdictional functions and competency through their authorities’. Even in cases where 
constitutionally territorial autonomy is not that strong, in practice, many indigenous 
groups in Latin America enjoy forms of territorial autonomy. 
In some cases, autonomy is used as a way to weaken the rights of indigenous 
communities. Peru has no autonomy regimes in general for its indigenous populations, 
but only for the indigenous peoples in isolation and initial contact in its territory to which 
it refers as ‘autonomous peoples’. ‘Reserves’ have been created for these communities 
since the 1980s, but the 2006 Law 28736 was adopted to further strengthen the 
framework of ‘indigenous reserves’. This law created a weaker system of protection for 
these communities because it permits extractive activities within these units when such 
activities are found to be of national interest and an environmental impact assessment 
(EIA)—rather than a human rights impact assessment—has been approved by the state. 
This is catastrophic for these communities.
34
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On the other hand, Nicaragua’s indigenous autonomy has been considered a 
model to be followed.
35
 Although Central and Pacific Coast indigenous communities lack 
recognition,
36
 indigenous communities on the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua enjoy both 
territorial and non-territorial autonomy. Both the North Atlantic Autonomous Region and 
the South Atlantic Autonomous Region are governed by regional councils, while their 
indigenous inhabitants also enjoy non-territorial ‘cultural autonomy’.
37
 After the Miskitu 
rebellion against the Sandinistas, autonomy was used in the 1980s as the prize of an 
ethnically exclusive, pan-indigenous movement. Law 28 on an Autonomy Statute for the 
Regions of the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua (‘Autonomy Law’) recognized the Spanish-
speaking mestizos, who were of mixed indigenous and Spanish origin and usually came 
from the Pacific coast of Nicaragua, the indigenous Miskito, Sumo, and Rama as well as 
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the Garifunas and the Creoles, who were native-born descendants of African slaves
38
 and 
established concrete rights for them, including to communal forms of property. The 
governments of the 1990s largely ignored the Autonomy law, while backing private 
natural resources exploitation projects in the Atlantic. After years of struggles, the 
constitution now guarantees rights of indigenous peoples to non-discrimination, free 
association, free expression, education in their mother tongue, and the right to administer 
their own affairs in conformity with traditions
39
 as well as the approval of regional 
councils for any concessions and exploitation projects of natural resources in the Atlantic 
coast.
40
 Although the implementation of the Autonomy law remains under question, at 
least it put an end to the rhetoric of a monocultural Nicaragua and opened a dialogue on 
the relationship between national politics and indigenous identity.
41
 In 2001, indigenous 
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autonomy resurfaced after a ruling by the Inter-American Court for Human Rights found 
that the Nicaraguan government had violated the rights to communal property of the 
Mayangna community of Awas Tingni.
42
 The Court held that Nicaragua had to adopt the 
necessary measures to create an effective mechanism for demarcation and titling of the 
indigenous communities’ territory, in accordance with their customary law, values, 
customs, and mores. Today, Nicaragua is again under Sandinista rule and the 
international debate on autonomy and indigenous–state relations is still lively.
43
 Since 
2001, the Inter-American Court for Human Rights has also held judgements where 
indigenous autonomy is linked to the right to property. 
9.4 Autonomy and Representation 
In certain contexts, particularly in South America, indigenous peoples who form 
majorities of the states seek to increase their collective autonomy through electoral 
politics. In the recent post-liberal governments in several Latin American states, 
including Bolivia, Venezuela, and Ecuador, new opportunities for indigenous political 
rights have arisen. In Bolivia, Evo Morales, an Ayamara leader, came to power with the 
support of the indigenous peoples. In Guatemala, indigenous leaders worked towards a 
unified pan-Mayan identity that runs through different linguistic and cultural 
communities. 
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An important issue that arises relates to the administrational units of autonomy for 
indigenous communities. Hernández-Díaz maintains that in Mexico, the construction of 
municipalities ‘have been reserved by indigenous peoples as a space from which they can 
defend their right to be different and counter central government policies. In local spaces, 
free of political positions and ideological debates, indigenous peoples have maintained, 
recreated, or developed forms of government different from those localities considered to 
be of mixed race or non-indigenous. Communities, at different moments in history, have 
used this institution as a means to defend themselves from, resist, and challenge the 
politics of the state.’
44
 The question whether the autonomous area coincides with the 
boundaries of an indigenous territorial unit, or is bigger to incude an autonomous 
municipal territorial unit that includes indigenous peoples is important for the rights of 
indigenous communities. In the second scenario, indigenous voices may get lost among 
other voices. In several places in Latin America, the indigenous party controlled 
‘alternative municipalities’ incorporate indigenous political and cultural elements,  
though at times without recognition of indigenous autonomies as such.
45
 However, in 
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some cases, the institution of the municipality works quite well for indigenous 
communities. 
Certainly, autonomy in Latin America is not only a top-down approach. A notable 
example of a more organic formulation is the ayllu system, the traditional form of a 
community in the Andes, defined as ‘a territory of a community of kin and (. . .) a socio-
economic organisation unit of the Andean culture that is based on solidarity and 
reciprocity’.
46
 Ayllus are self-sustained groups that own a piece of land and have specific 
hierarchies and obligations to one another. Schilling-Vacaflor discusses how the ayllu 
structures have been maintained in some areas of the highlands and valleys of Bolivia 
until today, despite the top-down syndical campesino organizations that have existed 
since 1952. Today, in some areas the ayllu continue to be the main autonomous 
organization of indigenous nations, whereas in others they have been substituted by the 
syndical organizations. Representatives of the ayllus are sent to the National Council of 
Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ), founded in 1997 to restore autonomy of 
indigenous peoples, including their ‘collective rights to land and natural resources, re-
definition of administrative units and self-determination exercised through indigenous 
                                                          
46
 Marcelo Francesco Osco, ‘Ayllu: Decolonial Critical Thinking and (AN)other 
Autonomy’, Indigenous Peoples and Autonomy, Insights for a Global Age, edited by 
Mario Blaser, Ravi de Costa, Deborah McGregor, and William D. Coleman (Vancouver: 
UCB Press, 2010), p. 30. 
autonomies and direct representation in state institutions’.
47
 CONAMAQ has a clear 
political vision for the indigenous peoples, that is, the return to pre-colonial relations 
between communities and the state, the rejection of existing political parties and 
syndicates as a dilution of indigenous power and claims, and the direct representation in 
state institutions, similar to Zapatistas’ claims in Mexico. The rejection of political parties 
and of syndicates has put them in conflict with their former political allies—MAS, the 
political movement led by Evo Morales. CONAMAQ opposed the tendency to extend 
indigenous rights also to the campesino populations (peasants) and disagreed with the 
incorporation of indigenous originario campesino autonomies established in the new 
constitution. This case highlights the difficulties that arise in the construction of specific 
autonomous areas where indigenous peoples live; and the tensions between indigenous 
peoples and other vulnerable parts of the population in their quest for effective political 
participation. Similar tensions exist between some of the indigenous ayllus in the 
highlands and the Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia  
(CSUTSB), the most important indigenous-campesino organization in Bolivia with the 
most members, founded in 1979. CSUTSB uses a ‘pan-indigenous face’, but being rather 
close to the government, it seems to promote autonomy of municipalities with rights 
equal to indigenous autonomies. The dual identity of indigenous peoples as indigenous 
and as members of the campesino syndicates has created challenges, deriving from the 
state’s insistence on treating indigenous peoples in a similar manner to other vulnerable 
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groups. The ratification of UNDRIP as state law in October 2007 is powerful ammunition 
for indigenous peoples in Bolivia, because it explicitly recognizes special rights to 
indigenous peoples because of historical injustices, level of distinctiveness, and historical 
continuity of these nations. 
In addition to the tensions that arise at times in constructing indigenous 
autonomies in the Americas (and beyond), and states’ attempts to treat indigenous claims 
for autonomy in similar ways to other such claims or other administrative divisions, this 
case also shows how indigenous identity in some Latin American indigenous individuals 
coexists with other powerful identities, for example the identity of the peasant, and how 
indigenous peoples have to manage these identities. In similar ways, their vision for 
indigenous autonomy is also shared with other visions in the political sphere, such as the 
socialist vision or the post-liberal agenda; again such visions have to be managed and are 
on occasions in conflict. Zapatistas in Mexico have been criticized for pursuing 
autonomy, when their struggle should join the voices for globalization, deregulation, and 
open markets.
48
 This parallel struggle for more indigenous rights and other visions is not 
that obvious in North America, where indigenous struggles have not so actively joined 
other struggles. To a large degree, this may be explained as a consequence of the policy 
of separation that was pursued by colonizers in North America, which may have 
prevented indigenous peoples from actively sharing political agendas with non-
indigenous peoples. 
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State interference in the way indigenous local governments are run is often 
justified on the basis of improving the system or ensuring democratic structures. 
However, in reality many of these structures weaken the indigenous political units and 
their representation. Oaxaca was the first state in Mexico to recognize in 1995 the 
practice of usos y costumbres, or customary law, as a legal means of selecting local 
leaders and managing day-to-day municipal operations. Since colonial times, 412 out of 
570 municipios in Oaxaca have run their affairs locally by a form of usos y costumbres. 
Most of these municipios were indigenous communities and the usos y costumbres 
included traditional customs and customary law to elect their local leaders. Since being 
included in state law, usos y costumbres has competed with the open-list electoral 
political party regime that prevails in the rest of the municipios and in the rest of the state. 
The usos y costumbres system was not based on democratic structures, ballot was not 
secret and some communities have systematically excluded some sections of the 
population, such as women, from participation in local political affairs. So, in 1995, the 
state gave citizens living in usos municipalities the option of voting for whomever they 
wanted in state and national elections while being formally allowed to continue their use 
of non-partisan, customary selection methods for local government offices. This was 
envisaged as a positive reform. However, as Stavahagen argues, ‘[w]hatever its original 
purpose, making it legal gave the governing PRI party an edge over its political rivals in 
assuming ownership over these communities in the face of increasing hard-ball party 
politics in a democratizing Oaxaca, where left-wing political movements were on the 
rise.’
49
 Hiskey and Goodman also criticize the initiative:  
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Without explicit efforts to strengthen indigenous citizens’ ties to the 
national political community, however, the usos legislation effectively 
insulated these municipalities from the state’s rapidly increasing 
multiparty electoral competition, increasing the chances that they would 
simply continue their clientelist relations with the PRI. This study argues 
that Oaxaca offers a textbook case of flawed and incomplete reforms 




9.5 Non-Territorial Autonomy: Autonomy in Juridical Matters 
Non-territorial autonomous regimes in the Americas include a variety of arrangements. 
The provision of the draft American Declaration that recognizes the right of indigenous 
peoples ‘to promote, develop and maintain their institutional structures and their 
distinctive customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, in the cases where 
they exist, juridical systems or customs, in accordance with international human rights 
standards’ has not yet been agreed. Article XXII—on the participation of indigenous 
peoples in decision-making in matters that affect them—is also controversial, ‘including 
those that the state agrees to with other states and multilateral institutions, as well as in 
the process of development of legislative, administrative and juridical measures’. 
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Mexico’, pp. 64–6. 
9.5.1 Free, prior, and informed consent as an expression of non-
territorial autonomy 
There can be no discussion on indigenous autonomy in the Americas without touching on 
the requirement of free, prior, and informed consent of indigenous peoples (FPIC) on 
decisions that affect them. Today, this is a major concern of indigenous peoples all 
around the Americas. Having the autonomy to put a stop on big development projects is 
essential to their survival and prosperity. Rights to participation and consultation, seen as 
political rights, are included in several legislative texts of the Americas, but do not go far 
enough to protect indigenous peoples in situations of natural resources exploitation. In 
Bolivia, for example, the participation of indigenous peoples is promoted, and permits for 
energy production are judged on the basis of referendums at the municipal and 
departmental levels. However, there the voices of the indigenous communities, who are 
much more affected by such projects than other local populations, are continuously 
obscured by the majority views.
51
 
FPIC is included in seven articles of UNDRIP, an instrument supported 
eventually by all American states. Article 19 of UNDRIP recognizes a collective right to 
giving or withholding consent by the indigenous peoples, according to the rules and 
procedures determined by the group itself, whereas Article 32(2) requires States to 
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‘consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their 
own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to 
the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, 
particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, 
water or other resources.’
52
 In 2009, the Human Rights Committee noted in Angela 
Poma Poma v. Peru,
53
 which involved the impact on water beneath indigenous peoples’ 
lands, that ‘participation in decision-making process must be effective, which requires 
not mere consultation but the free, prior and informed consent of the members of the 
community’.
54
 In the context of its Early Warning Urgent Action procedure the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has examined cases in 
Brazil, Canada, and Peru on their failure to obtain the FPIC of the affected indigenous 
peoples.
55
 The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights also affirmed in 
2009 the duty of States ‘to respect the principle of free, prior and informed consent of 
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indigenous peoples in all matters that affect them’.
56
 In its concluding observations to 
Colombia, the Committee repeated in 2010 that the right of indigenous peoples to FPIC 
should be respected before any project that affects indigenous peoples is implemented 
and that legislation must be enacted to ensure the respect of this indigenous right.
57
 
How strong is the requirement for consent in development projects? The Mexican 
former Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous Peoples, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, has referred to the ‘right to free prior 
informed consent by indigenous peoples’ which includes their ‘right to say no’ describing 
it as being of ‘crucial concern’ in relation to large-scale or major development projects 
and ‘essential’ for the protection of their human rights.
58
 His successor, James Anaya, has 
also adopted this line, explaining it further. Anaya has adopted a nuanced approach 
emphasizing that the strength of the requirement for FPIC would vary according to ‘the 
                                                          
56
 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), ‘General Comment No. 
21 on the Right of Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life’ (adopted 21 December 2012) 
UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/21 (2009), paras 36–7. 
57
 ‘Concluding Observations on Colombia’ (adopted 21 May 2010) UN Doc. 
E/C.12/COL/CO/5 (2010); ‘Concluding Observations on New Zealand’ (adopted 30 May 
2012) UN Doc. E/C.12/NZL/CO/3 (2012). 
58
 CHR, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People’ (adopted 21 January 2003) UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2003/90 (2003), paras 13 and 66. He points out that FPIC is necessary as too 
many major developments do not respect the consultation and participation criteria that 
are laid out in ILO Convention No. 169. 
circumstances and the indigenous interests involved’.
59
 He noted that a ‘direct impact on 
indigenous peoples’ lives or territories establishes a strong presumption that the proposed 
measure should not go forward without indigenous peoples’ consent’, and that ‘in certain 
contexts, that presumption may harden into a prohibition of the measure or project in the 
absence of indigenous consent’.
60
 The Special Rapporteur has recognized the 
development of an international norm requiring the consent of indigenous peoples when 
their property rights are impacted by natural resource extraction.
61
 He has confirmed that 
the 
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general rule [is] that extractive activities should not take place within the 
territories of indigenous peoples without their free, prior and informed 
consent. Indigenous peoples’ territories include lands that are in some 
form titled or reserved to them by the State, lands that they traditionally 
own or possess under customary tenure (whether officially titled or not), 
or other areas that are of cultural or religious significance to them or in 
which they traditionally have access to resources that are important to 
their physical well-being or cultural practices. Indigenous consent may 
also be required when extractive activities otherwise affect indigenous 
peoples, depending upon the nature of and potential impacts of the 
activities on the exercise of their rights. In all instances of proposed 
extractive projects that might affect indigenous peoples, consultations with 
them should take place and consent should at least be sought, even if 
consent is not strictly required.
62
 
The Inter-American System of Human Rights has been vocal on FPIC. The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights has confirmed the need for consultation in 
cases of natural resource extraction since 2001.
63
 In 2007, the Court held in Saramaka 
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 that in the case of large-scale development or an investment project 
that would have an impact on indigenous communities, the State ‘has the duty, not only 
to consult with the [indigenous group], but to obtain their free, prior and informed 
consent, according to their customs and traditions’.
65
 The Court was asked to decide on 
whether logging and mining concessions awarded by the State to third parties on 
indigenous lands violated indigenous rights and affirmed that in some cases the scope of 
Article 21 of the ACHR
66
 may comprise the exploitation of indigenous sub-soil 
resources.
67
 Unfortunately, the 2012 case of Kichwa v. Ecuador
68
 does not refer to the 
right to FPIC as such, but discusses instead the ‘right to consultation with the aim of 
reaching an agreement or obtaining consent’.
69
 The Court held that ‘the State did not 
conduct an appropriate and effective process that would guarantee the right to 
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consultation of the Sarayaku people before undertaking or authorizing the program of 
exploration or exploitation of resources on their territory’.
70
 
9.5.2 Autonomy in judicial matters 
Contrary to FPIC, where there is a lot to be done to protect it in the Americas, indigenous 
autonomy in judicial matters is more accepted than in other parts of the world. The 
recognition of indigenous juridical systems (art 34 of UNDRIP) has been quite a 
controversial issue during the elaboration of UNDRIP; in contrast, Article XI of the draft 
American Declaration which recognizes ‘the juridical personality of the indigenous 
peoples, respecting indigenous forms of organisation’ has already been agreed by 
member states whereas American States approved in 2011 that ‘the indigenous law and 
legal systems shall be recognised and respected by the national, regional and international 
legal systems’. 
Several American Constitutions are vocal on indigenous jurisdiction, both 
territorial and non-territorial. The Constitution of Bolivia 2009 states in Article 190 that 
‘the nations and native indigenous rural peoples shall exercise their jurisdictional 
functions and competency through their authorities and shall apply their own principles, 
cultural values, norms and procedures’. However, limitations are set in the next 
paragraph: ‘The rural native indigenous jurisdiction respects the right to life, the right to 
defence and other rights and guarantees established in the Constitution.’ Article 149 of 
the Constitution of Peru also states that ‘The authorities of the Native and Peasant 
Communities, with the support of the Peasant Rounds [Rondas Campesinas], may 
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exercise jurisdictional functions within their territory in accordance with common law, 
provided that they do not violate the fundamental rights of the individual.’ 
More cautiously, Article 260 of the Constitution of Venezuela proclaims: ‘The 
legitimate authorities of the native peoples shall have the power to apply, within their 
territorial competence levels of administration of justice based on their ancestral 
traditions and affecting their members only, in accordance with their own rules and 
proceedings, provided the same are not contrary to this Constitution, law and public 
order. The manner in which this special competence shall be co-ordinated with the 
national judicial system shall be determined by law.’ 
Article 246 of the Constitution of Colombia also sets domestic law as a limitation 
to indigenous jurisdiction: ‘The authorities of the indigenous peoples may exercise their 
jurisdictional functions within their territorial jurisdiction in accordance to their own laws 
and procedures, provided that these are not contrary to the Constitution and to the laws of 
the Republic. The law will establish the forms of coordination of this special jurisdiction 
with the national judicial system.’ The Constitution of Ecuador also explicitly recognizes 
in Article 1910 that indigenous authorities have judiciary functions in which they can 
apply customary norms and procedures ‘so long as they do not contest the constitution 
and the laws. Finally, the Constitution of Mexico in Article 2.II:  
guarantees and protects the rights of indigenous peoples and communities 
to II. Apply their own normative systems in the regulation and solution of 
their internal conflicts, subject to the general principles of this 
Constitution, respecting individual guarantees, human rights and, in 
relevant manner, the dignity and integrity of women. The law will 




The Court held in Chavez that Article 2 does not create ‘an independent and exclusive 




It is interesting that some of these constitutions, for example Peru, do not require 
that indigenous jurisdiction is in conformity with all legislation, but specifically only with 
Constitutional guarantees. Making indigenous jurisdiction stand only when in conformity 
with domestic law defeats the point and sweeps away the essence of autonomy. Even the 
prevalence of the Constitution over indigenous jurisdiction seems questionable; the 
condition of having indigenous jurisdiction dependent on international human rights law 
seems adequate to ensure human rights and also to be in the spirit of indigenous real 
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autonomy and self-determination.
73
 Any such assessment about the indigenous cultural 
norm must allow for a certain deference to the group’s ‘own interpretive and decision-
making processes in the application of universal human rights norms, just as states are 
accorded such deference’.
74
 The Supreme Court of Colombia seems to lean towards such 
interpretation: the Court has held that limiting the community’s autonomy, when it comes 
to situations regarding internal control, should be ‘the minimum acceptable’, and 
therefore ‘can only relate to what is truly intolerable in that they endanger man’s most 
precious assets.’
75
 Gomez Isa elucidates that ‘the Constitutional Court included in ‘this 
core of untouchable rights only the right to life, the prohibition of slavery and the 
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prohibition of torture’
76
 as well as ‘the legality of proceedings and, in criminal matters, 
the legality of offences and sentences’.
77
 Very interestingly, the Constitutional Court held 
that ‘only in relation to these can the existence of true intercultural consensus be 
predicated’.
78
 This of course limits a lot the leeway that the state has to restrict the rules 
deriving from indigenous autonomous regimes that relate to wholly internal indigenous 
situations, in cases when ‘all the elements defining a particular situation involve an 
indigenous community: both the perpetrator of the conduct and the injured party belong 
to the community, and the events have taken place within the territory of that 
community’.
79
 Gomez Isa discusses some cases where the community itself revisited and 
revised its own cultural rules. For example, she mentions how the U’wa community 
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Notable on this point is the recognition of the indigenous family norms and rules 
in the American draft Declaration, an important addition to provisions of UNDRIP. 
Agreed Article XVI recognizes ‘the various indigenous forms of family, in particular the 
extended family, as well as the forms of matrimonial union, filiations, descent, and 
family name’. However, the current text also proclaims that states should ‘take into 
account, primarily, the applicable indigenous law’ in family matters and that ‘the 
indigenous institutions, and indigenous courts where they exist’ shall have jurisdiction 
(art XVI), an addition which has not yet been accepted by States. 
Another interesting discussion that arises relates to the binding power of tribal 
laws in reservations on non-indigenous people. In the US, laws such as the Major Crimes 
Act of 1885 and Public Law 280 of 1953 have extended state criminal and civil 
jurisdiction in Indian country whether it relates to an indigenous or non-indigenous. The 
application of indigenous reservation laws to non-indigenous is a very important one as 
reports of a rape or sexual assault ‘epidemic’ among US indigenous women have recently 
surfaced. According to the US Department of Justice, ‘in at least 86 per cent of the 
reported cases of rape or sexual assault against American Indian and Alaska Native 
women, survivors report that the perpetrators are non-Native men’; and many such 
assaults happen within reservations.
81
 Amnesty International notes that ‘the complex 
interrelation between federal, state and tribal jurisdictions (. . .) undermines tribal 
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authority and often allows perpetrators to evade justice’;
82
 and ultimately fails victims. 
The concern about strict indigenous norms and laws is balanced by the need that such 
norms follow international human rights standards. 
9.6 Conclusions 
Autonomous regimes in the Americas differ substantially, a legacy of different 
circumstances, different colonial strategies, and different evolution of the states in which 
they live. In Latin America, indigenous claims for autonomy have run parallel to other 
political visions. Accordingly, Latin American indigenous groups seem to be in constant 
interaction (support but also competition) with other vulnerable groups. North American 
indigenous peoples are more separate in their struggle, which at times limits their impact 
on non-indigenous support. Still, the main challenges for the autonomy of all indigenous 
peoples in the Americas are similar: their primary concern is the impact of transnational 
corporations in their lands and territories. Autonomy in matters that affect them in the 
form of FPIC of indigenous peoples in such decisions is essential to protect their survival. 
Autonomy to apply their norms and rules is also important to them, for their cultural, 
political, and social development but also as a token of states’ respect of their identity and 
self-determination. Territorial autonomy has been a way in some states to promote 
indigenous control over their lives. However, transcribing such autonomous regimes from 
paper to reality has been a real challenge. New international instruments, regional and 
international human rights bodies, and the transnational indigenous movement work hard 
in highlighting such weaknesses and promoting further indigenous quests for real and 
effective autonomy. 
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